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Drug trafficking is a growing security problem in Latin America, specifically for Mexico and 
Colombia. This paper aims to identify the role of the Mexican and Colombian ‘criminal 
diasporas’ in the four different phases of drug trafficking: cultivation, production, transit and 
distribution. This paper introduces the notion of ‘criminal diaspora’ to unpack the connection 
between Mexican and Colombian criminal organisations and their respective migrants overseas 
involved in the narcotics trade. The notion of ‘criminal diaspora’ is useful in these case studies 
because it highlights the ethnic, identity and diasporic elements that characterise the migrant 
populations involved in Mexican and Colombian drug trade.  
The paper concludes that the role of the diasporic members in the whole process depends on 
their legal status, level of education and hierarchical status inside their respective drug 
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Drug trafficking is a growing security problem in Latin America, specifically for the major 
producers of narcotics in the region: Mexico and Colombia (UNODC, 2014). This paper aims 
to identify the role of the Mexican and Colombian ‘criminal diasporas’ in the four different 
phases of drug trafficking: cultivation, production, transit and distribution. This paper 
introduces the notion of ‘criminal diaspora’ to understand the connection between national 
criminal organisations and their migrants overseas involved in the narcotics trade. The notion 
of ‘criminal diaspora’ highlights the ethnic, identity and diasporic elements that characterise 
the migrant populations involved in drug trafficking.  
The main purpose of this paper is to answer to the following questions: 
- Why is the notion of ‘criminal diaspora’ useful to understand the dynamics and 
processes of drug trafficking in the American region?  
- Who are the members of the Mexican and Colombian criminal diasporas? 
- Why can we argue that members of the criminal transnational organisations form a 
diasporic community?  
- What is the role of the criminal diasporas in the drug trafficking process? 
- What are the differences and similarities between the Mexican and the Colombian 
criminal diasporas?  
In order to answer to these questions, this paper is organised into five chapters. The first chapter 
presents the existent literature of diaspora studies, notions and characteristics. In addition, this 
section frames the analysis and defines the terminology used in this research. This chapter also 
introduces the notion of ‘criminal diaspora’ as a tool for understanding the role of the members 
of the Mexican and Colombian diaspora involved in drug trafficking.  
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The second chapter presents an overview of drug trafficking in Mexico and in Colombia. After 
introducing the context and actors involved in drug trafficking in both countries, it is argued 
that Mexican and Colombian drug trafficking organisations have developed strong ties with 
the ‘criminal diaspora’ in order to guarantee the production, cultivation, transport and 
distribution of their narcotics. In addition, this section justifies the comparison between the 
Mexican and Colombian criminal diaspora. These cases are comparable for three reasons: first, 
because of the inability of both states to guarantee the security and monopoly of force in their 
respective territory; second, because both DTOs operate in similar ways; and third because 
both DTOs have formed international alliances to sustain their criminal activities. 
The third chapter explores the relation between drug trafficking organisations and criminal 
diasporas. It is argued that DTOs assign different roles to the members of their criminal 
diaspora according to their dwelling, capacity of mobilisation and status in the organisation. 
Furthermore, this chapter argues that both Mexican and Colombian DTOs have developed 
strong links with members of the ‘criminal diasporas’ to ensure access to intelligence1, their 
security and subsistence.  
The fourth chapter unpacks the role of the criminal diaspora in the cultivation and processing 
of narcotics. In this section, it is argued that Mexican and Colombian DTOs are expanding their 
activities to their neighbouring countries as a result of the restrictive laws against drug 
production and, import of chemicals required for processing and trafficking. In addition, it is 
demonstrated that Mexican and Colombian DTOs tend to subcontract croppers in other 
                                                          
1 According to the FBI, intelligence refers to both the individual organisations that shape raw data into a finished 
intelligence product for the benefit of decision makers and the larger community of these organisations. 
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countries but hire members of their respective criminal diasporas to manage the plantations and 
laboratories.  
Finally, the fifth chapter explores the role of the criminal diaspora in the transportation and 
distribution phases of the drug trafficking process. This section concludes that both the 
Mexican and Colombian criminal diasporas are developing routes for trafficking narcotics from 
South America to the United States. However, it is noted that the Mexican criminal diaspora 
has a predominant role in the distribution of narcotics due to US-gangs and the evolution of 
trade routes. 
This research is based on the reports of national and international organisations which focus on 
security and drug trafficking issues such as the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, the 
National Gang Intelligence Centre and Woodrow Wilson Institute. Furthermore, in order to 
complement the analysis and present specific cases of diasporic criminals actively involved in 
drug trafficking, information published in newspapers, and magazines specialised in organised 
crime such as InSightCrime, Stratfor and Nexos will be presented. Finally, this dissertation 
integrates several ethnographic studies which look at the mechanics and dynamics of drug 
trafficking in Mexico and Colombia. The incorporation of qualitative information extracted 
from newspapers and specialist magazines is relevant to provide specific cases where members 
of the criminal diasporas penetrate the transnational criminal networks.  
The objective is to present a clear analysis of the role of the members of the Colombian and 
Mexican criminal diasporas in drug trafficking. However, it is important to note that due to 
recent changes in anti-drug policies and the diversification of drug routes, the Mexican drug 
trafficking organisations are the protagonist actors in the narcotic trade. Therefore, the analysis 
primarily focuses on the Mexican case. 
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CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUALISATION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to fully understand the role of diasporas in drug trafficking and their involvement in 
each phase of the trade, it is necessary to define different concepts and notions that will frame 
this analysis. This chapter presents the key academic debates on diasporas involved in conflict 
and development. The current scholarship on diasporas does not address specifically the 
engagement and role of diasporic communities in drug trafficking.  However, this chapter 
demonstrates that transnational criminal networks constitute ‘criminal diasporas’. In sum, it is 
argued that ethnic and diasporic elements facilitate the cooperation between national and 
transnational criminals.  Finally, the notion of ‘criminal diaspora’ is introduced as the primary 
framework to study the role of the Mexican and Colombian diasporas in the drug trade.  
1. 1. Defining the ‘diaspora’ 
The use of the term ‘diaspora’ has proliferated in the last two decades (Brubaker, 2005). 
Academics have debated on how to distinguish a community of migrants, sojourners or 
travellers, from migrant communities that constitute a diaspora attached to their homeland. In 
fact, the scholarship on diaspora studies offers a big range of options to define the 
characteristics and elements of a diasporic community.  
According to Cohen (2008) the classical use of the term ‘diaspora’ was mainly applied to the 
study of the Jewish community. The Jewish experience connotes the scattering resulting from 
a cataclysmic event that traumatised the whole group, thereby creating ‘a central historical 
experience of victimhood at the hand of a cruel oppressor (Cohen, 2008: 1).’ Nevertheless, the 
recent social and economic transformations, transnational practices and the recognised 
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attachment of migrant communities to their homelands have modified the conceptualisation of 
the term ‘diaspora’. 
The term ‘diaspora’ is no longer a metaphoric designation used to describe different categories 
of ‘expatriates, expellees, political refugees, alien residents, immigrants, and ethnic and racial 
minorities (Safran, 1991).’ Nowadays, scholars recognise the de-territorialisation of identities 
and individuals constructing and deconstructing new socio-economic and political 
transnational spaces.  
Robin Cohen (2008) developed a typology to study diasporas based on two elements: dispersal 
and expansion.  On the one hand, the dispersal element takes into consideration the various 
mechanisms and reasons for displacement and migration. On the other hand, the expansion 
element emphasises the purposes of migratory flows and focuses specifically on diasporas’ 
formation (Cohen, 2008).  
Considering these two elements as the core basis of his typology, Cohen identifies five different 
types of diasporas. The first are ‘victim diasporas’, which involve persecution and forcible 
evacuation from their homeland (Cohen, 2008). This type of diaspora often refers to the Jewish 
experience, however nowadays Africans, Armenians, Irish and Palestinians are also considered 
victim diasporas (Mohan, 2002). The second category refers to ‘imperial diasporas’, which 
involve the ‘proactive colonisation of foreign land to be used as resource bases to service the 
imperial home (Mohan, 2002: 84).’ These diasporas include the Ancient Greeks, British, 
French, Dutch and Russians. The third type of diasporas identified by Cohen (2008) considers 
the cultural elements and styles that transcend national boundaries and territories. ‘Cultural 
diasporas’ are communities united in their exile by a mutual de-territorialised identity, for 
instance the Caribbean and Indian diasporas (Cohen, 2008 and Mohan, 2002). The fourth group 
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encompasses ‘labour diasporas’, identified as groups migrating to have access to better job 
opportunities than those available in their homelands. For example, the Indian, Italian, Turkish 
and Chinese diasporas (Cohen, 2008). Finally, the fifth category comprises ‘trade diasporas’, 
which involve a group of dispersed people who serve one or more markets in places other than 
their homeland (Mohan, 2002: 84). Members of trade diasporas are usually commuting 
between their home and their hostland therefore they never really settle abroad, remaining 
sojourners. Furthermore, they tend to congregate with traders from their place of origin in their 
host societies and (Mohan, 2002). Examples of this type of diasporas include the Venetians, 
Lebanese and Chinese (Cohen, 2008).  
The current consensus to designate diasporas includes three elements: the first is dispersion in 
space to two or more locations; the second, orientation towards a homeland; and the third, 
boundary maintenance over time (Gamlen, 2011 and Brubaker, 2005). In addition, there are 
some relevant characteristics pointed out by Gamlen: ‘diasporas include temporary or 
transnational migrants who hold some or other status and diasporas include longer term but 
still first-generation emigrants settled in another country (Gamlen, 2011: 267).’  In other words, 
both pioneer migrants and its descendants compose diasporas as long as they identify 
themselves as diasporic members and maintain ties with their homeland.   
Essentially, diasporas are heterogeneous subgroups, which share one thing in common: ‘a 
complex set of attachments to a perceived place of origin in which it is not resident (Bush, 
2011).’ The core particularity of diasporic members is their uninterrupted interaction with their 
homeland through different types of social, economic, political and cultural networks. In fact, 
‘diaspora engagement’ is the term that has been used to study the different channels of 
interaction between diasporic members and members of their homeland societies.   
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According to Gamlen, ‘diaspora engagement’ can refer to the bottom-up, grass-roots trans-
local activities of migrants and their associations (2011: 268). In this sense, diasporas are 
contextualised as active transnational agents participating in the social, economic and political 
life of their home country.  
Diaspora engagement has become a notion not only used by academics but also by international 
organisations, non-governmental organisations, policy makers and governmental offices. In 
general, international institutions have linked diaspora engagement with development 
(Gamlen, 2011). Accordingly, diasporic communities contribute to the economic acceleration 
and social well-being of their localities back home (Mohan, 2002).  
Overall, the scholarship looking at the relation between diasporas and development underline 
the positive effect that diasporic communities have in their homeland. However, some scholars 
have been sceptical about the exclusive positive impact and benefits of diasporic engagement, 
specifically in countries where there is an ongoing conflict. In fact, after analysing the role of 
diasporas in conflict zones, it has been concluded that they can either be peace-wreckers, 
peacemakers or decide to play neither role when their homeland is in a critical situation (Smith, 
2007). In general, the literature on diasporas in conflict zones emphasise a negative role of 
diasporic members financing and perpetuating the conflict (Smith, 2007).   
1. 2. Diasporas in conflict 
The conceptualisation of diasporic communities as ‘unaccountable and irresponsible long 
distance nationalists’ once established by Anderson in 1998 was fuelled and sustained by the 
World Bank’s econometric work (Turner, 2011:179). Collier and Hoeffler (2000) published 
the most important work conceptualising diasporas as fundamentally negative during conflict 
(Koser, 2007). In a World Bank Report, they argue that diasporas are usually much richer than 
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the population in their homeland and that they tend to be more “grievance-conscious” than the 
populations from which they originate. As a result, they argue that diasporas can on the one 
hand spark conflict, and on the other hand, represent a significant risk factor in the de-escalation 
and termination of the conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000). Using specific case studies and 
developing an econometric model, they conclude that countries with large diaspora populations 
living abroad are six times more likely to experience a recrudescence of violence (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2000).  
Most relevant literature that portrays diasporas as negative actors, underlines their nationalistic 
character, which encourages them to be directly engaged in the conflict and assist rebels. 
Kaldor argues that direct assistance from the diaspora living abroad includes material 
assistance, arms and money (2012: 109). Accordingly, the most illustrative cases of long-
distance nationalists who directly support violent conflict from afar are the Jewish American 
right wing extremists, the Irish-American supporters of the Irish Republican Army, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) settled in England, Canada and Norway, and the 
Kurds throughout Europe (Glick Schiller, 2005: 571). 
Perhaps the best-documented case study of diasporic engagement in conflict zones are the 
Tamil communities who finance the political and military struggle carried out by the LTTE 
(Williams and Picarelli: 2005). The LTTE established cells in 38 countries to obtain support 
from Tamil communities through either voluntary contributions or intimidation and extortion 
(Williams and Picarelli, 2005:133). 
The examples previously discussed reveal that the economic resources sent by diasporas to 
their homeland in war can be used to fuel and sustain the ongoing conflict. In fact, Lyons points 
out (2004, in Koser 2007) that due to their economic engagement, diasporas can become a 
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factor that complicates the processes of conflict resolution. However, it is important to note 
that diasporas do not engage with conflict societies exclusively through economic networks. 
On occasion, diasporas organise themselves to achieve political goals to retard or influence the 
de-escalation or termination of the conflict. As pointed out by Bush (2011), the political 
implications of diasporic engagement include the manipulation or lobbying of the hostland 
politicians and officers for example in the cases of Croatia, Armenia and Kurdistan (Bush, 
2011:198).  
Instead of unpacking the diasporic engagement in relation to their economic, military or 
political nature, Ali and Koser (2002) argue that diasporas can adopt direct or indirect strategies 
to change their home societies. On the one hand, they argue that direct strategies might include 
economic or military support, while on the other hand, indirect strategies might include 
working or lobbying through political institutions (Ali and Koser: 2002).  
Conversely, for the study of diasporic engagement in conflict zones, the distinction between 
indirect and direct strategies is limited. Firstly, the distinction proposed by Ali and Koser 
(2002) assumes that the members of the diaspora have full agency and power to determine in 
which sphere they want to intervene, either economic, political or military. Secondly, it 
presents a misguided dichotomy, which assumes that diasporas do not engage directly in 
political activities. On the contrary, it portrays diasporic political organisation as an indirect 
mechanism of transformation. Thirdly, this dichotomy diminishes the complexity of the 
transnational exchanges during conflict as well as the state of emergency, which characterises 
conflict zones.  
The literature influenced by Collier’s findings portrays diasporas as almost exclusively 
destructive actors fuelling the escalation of war. Most attention and studies of migrant 
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communities in conflict zones focus on the role of diasporas fomenting violence, financing 
weapons and inciting insurgency (Van Hear, 2011; Smith, 2007). However, Van Hear (2011) 
points out that in the last decade, there has been a general shift in the conceptualisation of 
diasporas as negative, bellicose and problematic agents. Overall, a more nuanced and critical 
view of the role of diasporas during conflict zones has been introduced in the scholarship more 
recently.  
For instance, Berdal (2005) argues that in conflict zones, where international aid is scarce, the 
transfer of funds can maintain marginalised groups. As a result, diasporic communities perform 
vital humanitarian functions to ensure access to aid to the most deprived groups back in their 
home societies. Arguing that diasporas involved in conflict can foment recovery, security and 
development, Van Hear (2011) suggests a typology to study the impact of economic transfers 
from abroad in conflict contexts.  
Diaspora transfers can be disaggregated into three different categories (Van Hear, 2011). First, 
the ‘transfers for survival’, which are sent to get people out of the area of immediate danger. 
These type of transfers are necessary for poorer households to sustain life during the escalation 
and even during the de-escalation of the conflict. The second category identified by Van Hear 
(2011) are the ‘transfers for coping’. He argues that acute crisis are the exception rather than 
the rule, thus, these financial transfers help to meet the daily needs of the deprived groups. In 
addition, he explains that transfers for coping may again assist people to get out of danger (Van 
Hear, 2011: 98). Finally, the third rubric developed by Van Hear encompasses the ‘transfers 
for accumulation’. During the ceasefires and peace processes, the resources sent by the 
diasporic members might be used to reconstruct the infrastructure in the aftermath of the 
conflict.   
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The typology developed by Van Hear (2011) is useful to understand to a certain extent the 
dynamics of conflicts and their impact on the expenditure of remittances in conflict zones. 
However, the distinction between ‘transfers for survival’ and ‘transfers for coping’ remains 
very subtle. In fact, the expenses made in torn-war societies during these two rubrics overlap. 
In addition, the ‘transfers for accumulation’ rubric suggests that remittances are invested in the 
development of infrastructure (Van Hear, 2011: 28). There are misleading processes suggested 
by the label chosen by Van Hear for this category. ‘Accumulation’ refers to a process of 
revenue conglomeration and storage. As such, the accumulation process suggests that there is 
a pre-accumulation process where all the basic needs are covered and guaranteed. Nevertheless, 
Van Hear (2011) suggests that the ‘transfers for accumulation’ are used to reconstruct houses, 
therefore the basic housing of marginalised groups has not been guaranteed during a pre-
accumulation process.  
Instead, of using a misleading label or trying to separate overlapping expenses, it would be 
more fruitful to study the impact and expenditures of remittances in each phase of the conflict. 
Looking at how people spend remittances during the initiation, escalation, de-escalation and 
termination of the conflict might enable us to have a better idea of the type of expenditures 
made during the conflict.  
Overall, diasporas have been portrayed either as negative (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, Koser, 
2007) or positive agents intervening in conflict zones (Van Hear, 2011; Berdal, 2005). During 
on-going wars, diasporas have proven to engage with their host societies to fuel the conflict by 
providing weapons, rebels or financial resources (Kaldor, 2012, Smith 2007). Nevertheless, 
diasporic members have also played an important role in the alleviation, reconstruction and aid 
recovery for war-torn societies (Van Hear, 2011; Berdal 2005). Even if this dichotomy still 
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presents a quite simplistic view of diaspora engagement in war zones, it reveals that the process 
is complex because of the dynamics, actors and the interests resulting from the conflict.  
The scholarship studying diasporas in conflict zones reveals that there is not a clear consensus 
about the role that diasporas play in the transformation of war-torn societies. However, as 
Berdal clearly states, ‘the impact of diaspora and migrant remittances on conflict is highly 
context-specific (Berdal, 2005).’ By accepting this last premise, this essay introduces an 
innovative framework to analyse the role of diasporas specifically involved in drug-trafficking 
related conflicts. The notion of ‘criminal diaspora’ seems appropriate to study the Mexican and 
Colombian diasporas involved in drug trafficking because it emphasises the exclusive criminal 
nature of their activities, as well as the specificities of the drug trafficking processes. 
1. 3. Criminal diaspora 
Garzón (2013) coined the notion of ‘criminal diaspora’ in a Woodrow Wilson Paper in an effort 
to understand the criminal networks in Latin America, specifically in Colombia, Mexico and 
Central America. This section will argue that this notion is useful to frame the diasporic 
engagement with their homeland in the context of drug trafficking. 
The notion of ‘criminal diaspora’ is useful to frame the study of criminals involved in 
transnational criminal networks because of the way they operate and the relation they have with 
their origin and host societies.   
Focusing on the causes of their displacement and behaviour in their host societies, Cohen 
(2008) identifies several characteristics of diasporic groups. He considers that members of 
diasporas are:  
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dispersed from an original homeland, […] in pursuit of work or trade, […] maintain a 
collective memory about the homeland and strong ethnic connections, […] have a 
troubled relationship with host societies, […] and commute between their home and 
their hostland  remaining sojourners (Cohen, 2008:17). 
These characteristics are relevant and applicable to the study of transnational connections 
between the Mexican and Colombian DTOs and criminals from their same place of origin 
dwelling abroad. In fact, Mexican and Colombian criminals collaborating in drug trade are 
usually scattered from their place of origin, in pursuit of work, usually having a troubled 
relationship with their host society, with strong ethnic connections to their homeland and living 
a transnational unsettled life.  
Drug trafficking encompasses four different stages: cultivation, processing, transport, and 
distribution of narcotics (Clutterbuck, 1990). In each of these phases, there are agents who 
sustain and develop criminal networks with merely economic purposes. It is important to note 
that the legal aspect of the trade is not relevant because in each phase of the drug trafficking 
process, there are legal and illegal activities performed by legal or illegal actors (Zaitch: 2002).  
In addition, the nature and complexity of the drug trafficking process blur the distinction 
between illegal and legal acts. For instance, in the transport phase of the process, actors might 
use both illegal and legal channels of transportation, for example delivery companies and 
collusion with officials at the border (Zaitch: 2002). 
As a result, this paper conceptualises the members of a diaspora involved in drug trafficking as 
members of the ‘criminal diaspora’.  This framework highlights the diasporic characteristics of 
people involved in drug trafficking activities, such as attachment with the homeland, ethnic 
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and cultural features, the relation with their host society and their incorporation and activity in 
organised crime networks. 
Finally, it is important to point out as Nonini (2005) states, that diasporas participating and 
involved in criminal networks form ‘only small minorities among much larger populations of 
migrants seeking employment and security from persecution in core regions (Nonini, 2005: 
567).’ The ‘criminal diaspora’ is the exception rather than the norm of diasporic communities 
interacting with their homeland. Nevertheless, the levels of violence and homicide rates related 
to drug trafficking reported in Latin America (UNODC, 2012 and Garzón, 2013) underline the 









CHAPTER 2: ORIGINS AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE MEXICAN AND COLOMBIAN 
DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANISATIONS (DTOS) 
Before analysing the role of the Mexican and Colombian criminal diasporas in drug trafficking, 
it is necessary to understand the dynamics and actors involved in the cultivation, processing, 
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transport and distribution of narcotics in both countries. This chapter reviews the origins and 
consolidation of both the Mexican and Colombian Drug Trafficking Organisations (DTOs). In 
addition, it emphasises the outcomes and conflicts generated by the drug trade in both Latin 
American states. Finally, the last part of this chapter presents the arguments justifying the 
comparison between the Mexican and the Colombian case studies.  
2. 1. Mexican DTOs 
Drug trafficking in Mexico is not new; in fact, marijuana and opium production began in the 
19th century in the state of Sinaloa (Osorno, 2009). However from 2006, when the ‘war against 
drug’ was declared, drug trafficking became a major source of conflict and violence in the 
country. Drug trafficking in Mexico has been the cause of hundreds of homicides and a wave 
of terror in Mexico (Grillo, 2012). The exact number of homicides related to drug trafficking 
is difficult to determine because of two main reasons. First, because drug trafficking is an 
integral part of organised crime (Richani, 2007), therefore the data concerning all acts of 
violence committed by two or more persons are lumped together on many occasions. Second, 
the methodology used to collect this type of data is not very reliable and rigorous due to the 
illegal nature of the phenomenon.  
 
 
Beittel (2013) states that most analysts estimate that in Mexico, there have been at least 60,000 
homicides related to organised crime since 2006. Accordingly, data shown in Figure 1. shows 
that from 2007 to 2010, the murders related to organised crime in Mexico skyrocketed. Several 
security analysts attribute this growth to the war against drugs declared during government of 
president Calderon from 2006 to 2012 (Bonne, 2012; Grillo, 2012, Bagley, 2012). In fact, in 
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2007, after president Calderon decided to deploy 2,837 soldiers throughout the country the 
number of deaths associated to drug trafficking increased from one every six days to 19 per 
day (Langton, 2012).  
FIGURE 1. HOMICIDES RELATED TO ORGANISED CRIME ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO FROM 2001-2013 
ACCORDING TO TWO DIFFERENT SOURCES 
 
Sources: Shirk and Rios (2011) and López, Milenio Newspaper (2013)  
When Calderon started his mandate in 2006, there were roughly half a dozen of drug trafficking 
organisations (Bonne, 2012). Nevertheless, the war against drugs dramatically changed this 
panorama in four ways: it increased the number of DTOs (Figure 2) (Guerrero Gutierrez, 2012), 
it strengthened the transnational criminal networks (Bagley, 2012), it increased the level of 
violence and terror in Mexico (Grillo, 2012) and it posed security threats in neighbouring 
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FIGURE 2.  PROLIFERATION OF THE MEXICAN DTOS, 2006-2010 
 
Source: Bagley, B. (2012). “Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major 
Trends in the Twenty-First Century”- Washington D.C: Woodrow Wilson Centre. 
Despite the DTOs fragmentation and proliferation of new organisations, six main DTOs control 
the narcotics trade within and outside the Mexican state (Figure 3). The Sinaloa DTO controls 
the drug trafficking and production in the ‘Golden Triangle’ states (Chihuahua, Durango and 
Sinaloa), and is active in Europe, the US and in several countries in South and Central America. 
They specialise in poppy and marijuana cultivation and processing of heroin and 
methamphetamine (UNODC, 2012). In addition, this DTO fights for more control of trafficking 
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routes through Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas and Baja California (Figure 3) (Arson and 
Olson, 2011). 
The Gulf DTO is originally from Tamaulipas but operates in other states in the centre and in 
the north of Mexico. Los Zetas are formerly the armed wing of the Gulf DTO; however, they 
have expanded their networks across other Mexican states, the US and in other countries. 
Today, they constitute one of the most dangerous, ruthless and disciplined DTOs from Mexico 
(Arson and Olson, 2011). The Zetas do not only engage in drug trafficking but also in a range 
of predatory activities such as extortion, kidnapping, migrant smuggling and human trafficking 
(UNODC, 2012).  
The Juarez DTO controls mainly the north of the country and cities in Chihuahua. This 
organisation plays a central role in the conflict for the control of the border (Arson and Olson, 
2011). The Tijuana cartel is settled in the north-west of Mexico and controls mainly the drug 
trafficking with the US in the Tijuana-San Diego border. Finally, the Familia Michoacana DTO 
is based in Michoacan but has also an important presence in other west-central states and in 
Mexico City (Acosta, 2012).  
 
 




Source: Stratfor and Mexican Attorney’s General Office 
As previously mentioned, one of the main consequences of the war against drugs in Mexico 
was  the expansion of the international criminal networks of the Mexican DTOs in other 
countries such as Guatemala, Colombia, Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador (UNODC, 
2012). This effect is known as the ‘cockroach effect’, referring specifically to the ‘displacement 
of criminal networks from one city/state/region to another within a given country or from one 
country to another in search of safer havens and more pliable state authorities (Bagley, 
2012:11).’ In the next sections, it will be argued that the ‘cockroach effect’ caused by the 
restrictive measures promoted by the Mexican and American authorities fuelled the 
transnational criminal networks and the vigorous interaction between Mexican DTOs and 
members of the criminal diaspora.   
 
2. 2. Colombian DTOs 
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Colombia has experienced more than fifty-seven years of war, making it the longest-running 
20th century internal armed conflict that has endured into the 21st century (Chernick, 2005: 
178). The conflict originated in the mid-1940s and involved the government, three insurgent 
groups, two left wing guerrillas (ELN and the FARC) and a ‘right wing guerrilla’ (Díaz, 2011). 
Overall, the conflict resulted in the death of more than 300,000 people, 400,000 refugees and 
almost 4 million internally displaced persons (Díaz, 2011; UNHCR 2012).  
During the conflict, the Colombian government confronted an insurgency of armed guerrillas 
looking to replace the Colombian state (Beittel, 2013). The evolution of the conflict became 
complex because of the number of parties involved and the activities performed by each of 
them. For instance, Mejía Tirado (2005) explains that the expansion of guerrilla groups led to 
an explosion of new organisations such as pro-soviet guerrillas (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC and the 
Ejército de Liberación or National Liberation Army), pro Chinese guerrillas; Cuban style 
guerrillas (Quintin Lame) and Trotskyist guerrillas (2005:113). 
In addition, Guáqueta (2003) points out the different trends of the Colombian conflict from the 
beginning of the 1990s. Overall, she argues that the conflict progressively expanded in the 
number of combatants involved and in the number of regions affected. In addition, she explains 
that the conflict was increasingly financed by criminal activities such as drug trade, extortion, 
kidnapping, money laundering, the illegal exploitation of minerals, and arm trafficking 
(Guáqueta, 2003:4).  
In fact, during the post-war period, guerrillas and paramilitaries  became directly involved in 
drug trafficking and illegal activities (Chernick, 2005). For instance, 45% of the income of the 
FARC comes from drug trade and about 70% of the profits made by the paramilitary militias 
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so called Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self- Defence Forces of Colombia, or 
AUC)  are related to drug trafficking (Díaz, 2011:9).  
According to Bagley (2012), by the late 1990s these two groups gained control of coca 
cultivation and processing throughout rural Colombia (2012:4). The high profitability of drug 
trade appealed to both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries and became their main source of 
financing to expand their military capacities and territory (Guáqueta, 2003). In fact, from 1970 
to 2000, Colombia became one of the most important drug producers and distributors in the 
world. It went from being a minor marijuana exporter to the largest cocaine producer and 
exporter since 1982 and an important source of heroin since 1996 (Guáqueta, 2003:4). In 
addition to the guerrilla and paramilitary groups involved in drug trafficking, the two major 
DTOs in Colombia in charge of the cultivation, processing, transport and distribution of 
narcotics were the Medellin and Bogota organisations dismantled in the 1990s (Arson and 
Olson: 2011; Clutterbuck: 1990).   
The complexity and outcomes of the conflict as well the attacks by the illegal armed groups 
designated as ‘terrorist’ groups by the US State Department (Bouvier, 2007) created a state of 
emergency in Colombia.  As a result, the Colombian government with the collaboration of the 
US formulated and launched the Plan Colombia in 1998 (Thoumi, 2012). The Plan included 
counter-insurgency and anti-drug initiatives to reduce drug production and  violence in the 
Colombian territory. The project cost over $6 billion and had three main objectives: (1) reduce 
the flow of illicit narcotics and improve security; (2) promote social and economic justice; and 
(3) promote the rule of law (Jenner, 2014). Some of the efforts to eradicate drug trafficking 
included seizing the crops and spraying of herbicide (Jenner, 2014). Despite the numerous 
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efforts to control the cultivation of narcotics, the global cocaine production and distribution did 
not decline (UNODC, 2012). 
The maintained levels of narcotic production are explained by the so called ‘balloon effect’, 
which describes the phenomenon by which reductions in illegal drug activity in one country 
lead to increases in another (Arson and Olson, 2011). In fact, according to Jenner (2014), in 
the aftermath of Plan Colombia, the level of cocaine production was curtailed in Colombia but 
the global production remained steady because Peru and Bolivia filled the demand of the 
market (2014: 79).  
Just as in the case of Mexico, restrictive anti-drug initiatives propelled the diversification of 
criminal networks in two main ways. First, as noted by Arson and Olson (2011), the ‘balloon 
effect’ boosted the production and trade of narcotics in other Latin American countries such as 
Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador. Second, as a result of the prosecution and law 
enforcement, Colombian DTOs started looking for allies to ensure the route of trade for their 
narcotics, for instance with Mexican DTOs (Garzón, 2013). 
Nowadays, there are four main Colombian DTOs. The Ratrojos operate in the Pacific Coast 
and in the Venezuelan border. In addition, they have developed partnerships with the Sinaloa 
and Juarez Mexican DTOs (Arson and Olson, 2011). The Urabeños, which are remnants of the 
AUC, are positioned along the Panamanian border and collaborate with the Mexican Gulf DTO 
(Arson and Olson, 2011). The FARC operate in the Ecuadorian, Venezuelan, and Panamanian 
borders and sell their products to the Tijuana and Juarez DTOs. Finally, the Paisas (originally 
members of the Medellin DTO) control the Caribbean coast and have been linked with the 
Mexican Zetas (Arson and Olson, 2011). 
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In the next sections, it will be argued that the ‘balloon effect’, just as the ‘cockroach effect’ 
(Garzón, 2013) have been partially sustained by the criminal diasporas in both the Mexican 
and the Colombian cases. Nevertheless, before proceeding into the analysis the relevance of 
comparing the Mexican and Colombian case studies will be demonstrated, since the conflicts 
in both countries are not exactly from the same nature.  
2. 3. Comparison between Mexico and Colombia 
The comparison between the Mexican and Colombian conflicts have generated several 
academic debates. For instance, Beittel (2013) explains that some analysts compare the two 
cases to evaluate the success or limitations of the restrictive measures implemented with the 
help of the US. On the contrary, some observers stress that the origins, goals and outcomes of 
both conflicts are different.  
This paper focuses explicitly on the drug trafficking mechanisms and specifically on the role 
of the diasporic communities in these processes. It is important to note that the comparison is 
exclusively made on the criminal diasporas enrolled and participating in the drug trafficking. 
As a result, the analysis excludes the origins and causes of the bleeding conflicts.  
In this paper, the comparison between the Mexican and the Colombian criminal diasporas is 
justified by three elements. The first element considers the weakness of both states. As argued 
by Thoumi (2012), the central governments in Colombia and in Mexico could not control large 
areas of the country and local political establishments controlled by DTOs. The lack of capacity 
of in both states as well as the proliferation of corruption in government institutions (Garzón, 
2013) constitute the first similarity between both cases. As noted by Garzón (2013), corruption 
of government institutions is one necessary condition for the spread of criminal networks 
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constituted by customs, migration officials, police, government authorities and diasporic 
members.  
For the Colombian case, Clutterbuck (1990) explains that corruption, intimidation and weak 
institutions facilitated the cultivation, processing, transport, and distribution of narcotics in the 
region. In addition, the growth and entrenchment of these criminal networks replaced the state 
in several localities. For instance, the FARC and other insurgents controlled more than a third 
of the country’s municipalities (Beittlel, 2013). The propagation of corruption, the weak rule 
of law and lack of governance characterised the Mexican state as well. Beittel (2013) argues 
that the degree to which some Mexican municipalities are controlled by the DTOs is hard to 
determine. Nevertheless, he states that Mexican authorities and drug lords have collaborated to 
sustain an imputative system. Overall, these elements show that both the Mexican and the 
Colombian DTOs had enough power to collude with political and judicial authorities and 
challenge the monopoly of force of their respective states.  
The second element of similarity between the Mexican and Colombian DTOs is their modus 
operandi. DTOs from both countries are hierarchical organisations operating transnationally 
and committing criminal and violent activities. Even if the nature and ultimate goals of the 
DTOs may vary, it has been noted than the means used to achieve their objectives are very 
similar. Both in Mexico and in Colombia, DTOs have diversified into other predatory activities 
such as extortion, kidnapping, oil theft, money laundering, taxing and directing drug 
trafficking, migrant smuggling, and human trafficking (Beittel 2013, Chernick 2005, UNODC 
2012, Berdal 2005).  
Finally, the third element of comparison between Mexican and Colombian DTOs are the 
outcomes of restrictive policies in both countries. As previously mentioned, the ‘balloon and 
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cockroach’ effects (Arson and Olson, 2011 and Garzón, 2013) have propelled an intensification 
and expansion of international criminal networks. The governmental efforts to dismantle DTOs 
in both countries have forced the criminal organisations to look for safer places to cultivate and 
produce narcotics and for safer routes to ensure their transport and distribution. Overall, the 
strategies of the DTOs in both countries are similar. For instance, both DTOs migrated to 
neighbouring countries to reallocate their plantations or narcotic laboratories and refineries 
(Arson and Olson, 2011; Bagley, 2012; Zaitch, 2002).  
The displacement of their place of origin has also pushed the DTOs to form transnational 
alliances and to develop solid relations with their criminal diasporas. For instance, academics 
and ethnographers have traced alliances between Mexican and Colombian DTO (Beittel 2013 
and Bragley 2012). In fact, Beittel (2013) argued that the intense efforts to dismantle the 
‘traditional’ Colombian trafficking route through the Caribbean have strengthened relations 
between the Mexican and Colombian DTOs. Nowadays Colombian DTOs subcontract 
Mexican organisations to ensure a safer route of trafficking narcotics to the US (Beittel, 
2013).The three elements mentioned in this part constitute a solid framework of analysis to 
justify the comparison between the Mexican and Colombians DTOs. In general, the strategies 
developed by both groups are very similar. The rest of the paper will discuss the mechanisms 
and relations between the Mexican and Colombian DTOs and the respective members of their 







CHAPTER 3: CRIMINAL DIASPORAS AND DRUG TRAFFICKING 
This chapter studies the relationship between criminal diasporas and drug trafficking. In 
addition, it argues that national DTOs recruit and make alliances with diasporic members to 
endure their access to intelligence, security and subsistence. 
3. 1. The link between criminal diasporas and drug trafficking 
In an attempt to understand the mobility of criminal groups, Varese (2010), argues that 
members of DTOs decide to move either strategically or unintentionally. Looking at the case 
of Italian Mafias, Varese determines that criminals end up moving strategically to a new 
territory when they are searching for new resources, investment opportunities or they wish to 
invade a new market (Varese, 2010:8). Nevertheless, he argues that criminals might also move 
unintentionally when they are not actively looking to open a criminal branch and expand their 
network abroad. In fact, he states that these criminals might leave their homeland for reasons 
unrelated to crime, such as poverty or persecution.  
This dichotomy is useful to understand how pioneer migrants integrate into criminal networks. 
However, it does not take into consideration members of the diaspora already settled in foreign 
countries who decide to integrate into DTOs. Contrary to the case of Italian Mafias, described 
by Varese (2010), Latin American DTOs, specifically the Mexican ones have proven to interact 
with Mexican American gangs originally born in the US but that maintain a collective memory 
and strong ethnic connections to Mexico (Finckenauer  and Albanese: 2014).  
In fact, the US National Gang Intelligence Centre (2011, 2013) has recently confirmed the 
increasing interaction between gangs and DTOs (Figure 4). In relation to this, the National 
Gang Intelligence Centre has reported that in 2009, more than 900,000 criminally active gang 
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members, representing approximately 20,000 domestic street gangs in more than 2,500 cities, 
dominated drug distribution in the United States (NGIC, 2010: 12). In addition, according to 
the National Drug Intelligence Centre, more than 45 percent of law enforcement agencies in 
the Southwestern US reported that gangs were moderately to highly involved in drug 
trafficking during 2010 (National Gang Intelligence Centre, 2011).  
The available data published by the National Gang Intelligence Centre (2010, 2011, 2013), as 
well as ethnographies studying drug trafficking between Mexico and the US (Grillo 2012; 
Campbell, 2009; Langton, 2012) highlight the increasing interactions between Mexican DTOs 
and Mexican gang associations in the US making it necessary to understand the role of criminal 
diasporas involved in drug trade.  
FIGURE 4. GANG ASSOCIATIONS WITH CRIMINAL ORGANISATIONS BY NATIONALITY 
 
Source: National Gang Intelligence Center, 2011. The following figures represent the 













Focusing on the dispersion and expansion of the criminal diaspora (Cohen, 2008) and analysing 
the available data we can observe that the Mexican and Colombian criminal diasporas are 
formed by two different groups of migrants. First, pioneer migrants who are actively looking 
for the expansion of the criminal networks or who are just simply moving in search of shelter 
(Varese, 2010). These pioneer migrants move from their country of origin with the specific 
purpose of finding new strategies, supplies, resources and routes for drug trafficking or shelter 
and security.  
The second type of migrants are those already established in a foreign country. In the specific 
case of criminal diasporas, this refers to second and upper generations, attached to their 
homeland and participating in transitional criminal activities. Even if both types of migrants 
constitute criminal diasporas, this distinction is valuable because pioneer and established 
migrants perform different activities and have different roles in each phase of the drug 
trafficking process. As will be demonstrated in the next section, DTOs assign specific tasks to 
members of their criminal diaspora according to their place of origin, citizenship and status in 
the hierarchy of the organisation. DTOs have integrated members of their criminal diasporas 









FIGURE 5. GANGS WITH SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE ON US DRUG MARKETS 
NAME 
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Source: United States Department, Attorney General’s Report on Growth of Violence Street 
Gangs in Suburban Areas, April 2000; High Intensity Drug Area reporting. Available in 






































































3. 2. Interests of exploiting diasporic networks  
In this section, it is argued that the DTOs exploit their criminal diasporas to ensure their access 
to intelligence, security and subsistence. The core of this analysis will focus on Mexican DTOs 
because they are mainly in charge of the drug trade to the US as a result of its geographical 
proximity and the alliances developed with Colombian DTOs (Beittel, 2013). Even if there is 
more information for the Mexican DTOs due to the intensity and size of the drug trade in the 
Mexican-US border, the Colombian case also presents relevant examples to support this 
analysis (Bagley, 2012; Burton and West, 2008).  
Intelligence 
Looking at the interaction between DTOs and their criminal diasporas, it can be observed that 
members of the criminal diasporas are able to provide tactical intelligence and information for 
drug lords.  In fact, DTOs have interests in developing a strong relationship with their criminal 
diaspora because they provide helpful information and updates about the situation of the 
border.  
A Stratfor report notes that Mexico’s cartels rely on US gangs with Hispanic origins such as 
Barrio Azteca because they know the border, the terrain, the drug prosecutors, investigators, 
and the dynamics between other gangs (Grillo, 2012; Guerrero Gutiérrez, 2010). The 
information provided by the Mexican-American gangs enables the Mexican DTOs to reduce 
the risk while trading drugs. As noted by Burton and West (2008), getting drugs across the 
Mexican-US border requires local connections to bribe border guards or police. In addition to 
the information provided by gang members to DTOs, members of street gangs might have 
contracts at crossing points at the border to facilitate drug trade.   
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Some gangs have proven to have a resourceful network of informants in different federal 
American institutions. For instance, the case of Sandy Valles New, who worked in the 
investigations section of the Office of the Federal Public Defender in El Paso from 1996 to 
2002. The FBI arrested Sandy in 2007 after agents discovered she was transmitting information 
to gang leaders (El Paso Times, 2008). When detained she admitted to travelling to Ciudad 
Juarez in Mexico to share information directly with Mexican drug lords. Overall, the 
information gathered by the members of the criminal diaspora and shared with Mexican DTOs 
is useful to minimise the risks involved in drug trafficking. Nevertheless, this is not the only 
way in which gangs provide protection to Mexican DTOs.  
Security 
DTOs have security interests in establishing links with their criminal diaspora because of three 
main reasons. First, adding more actors in the drug trafficking process by subcontracting 
members of their criminal diaspora reduces the chance to be traced or caught by drug 
prosecutors. According to Guerrero Gutiérrez (2010), an asset of the interaction between DTOs 
and gangs, is that the latter are independent cells that do not know exactly how DTOs operate. 
As a result, even if members of the criminal diaspora are arrested, they might not be able to 
provide information to the authorities about the modus operandi of the DTO they are linked 
with.  
A second security advantage resulting from the interaction between Mexican and Colombian 
criminal diasporas and their respective DTOs derives from their cultural and ethnic 
rapprochement. Zaitch (2002) explains that ethnic ties are declared ‘functional’ to DTOs for 
their ability to control information flows, keep solidarity, trust and loyalty. This ‘functionality’ 
can be explained by the nature of the criminal diaspora to maintain a ‘collective memory about 
40 
 
the homeland and strong ethnic connections (Cohen, 2008: 17).’ In fact, during his fieldwork, 
Zaitch (2002) discovered that drug traffickers consider the ethnicity and nationality of the 
people they work with abroad. Colombian DTOs tend to develop closer criminal ties with 
members of their own ethnicity because they portray them as more trustworthy and loyal people 
(Zaitch: 2002). The same tendency can be observed in the case of Mexican DTOs who develop 
ties with gangs with Mexican origins (Figure 4 and 5). 
Finally, a third security reason for the DTOs to collaborate with members of their criminal 
diaspora is the fact that they might know family members of the diaspora living back in their 
place of origin, especially if they are pioneer migrants. As a result, DTOs have power over the 
members of their criminal diasporas. For example, in his research, Zaitch (2002) interviewed 
Colombian people involved in drug trafficking in Europe who were still very connected with 
their family members back in their homeland.  
DTOs operate by threatening and extorting people (Bagley, 2012). In fact, as explained by 
Brophy (2008) drug traffickers use force or threats for the settling of scores when there is an 
issue. This type of ‘conflict resolution’ used by DTOs could be also applied to members’ 
criminal diasporas. Interacting with people from the same community gives them the power to 
threaten family members and acquaintances of members of their criminal diasporas back in 
their homeland. As a result, the relation between DTOs and criminal diasporas becomes 
interdependent and reliable.  
Subsistence 
Finally, the criminal diaspora facilitates access to infrastructure, sources, distribution channels 
and shelter that sustain drug trafficking processes. By creating and maintaining alliances with 
41 
 
their criminal diasporas, DTOs have access to a cheaper and reliable workforce, arms and 
trafficking routes. 
The first advantage offered by the criminal diaspora, at least for the case of the Mexican DTOs 
is the easy access to arms. According to McDougal et al. (2013), most of the weapons used in 
drug related conflicts in Mexico since 2006 are made in the US (2013:5). In fact, these scholars 
argue that a significant proportion (46.7%) of US firearm dealers are dependent on Mexican 
demand. The volume of arms produced in the US and the seizures in Mexico simultaneously 
reveal the inability of the governments to control the porosity of the border and the ability of 
DTOs to access firearms.  
Tracking the number of trafficked arms into Mexico is a hard task because of the illegal nature 
of the process, the number of registered guns produced and purchased and the lack of 
inspections on gun dealers in the US (McDougal et al., 2013). However, it is believed that most 
of the firearms confiscated in Mexico come from California, Arizona and Texas, all border 
states (McDougal et al., 2013).  
After an investigation in the south of the US, McGreal (2011) reports that US federal agents 
have discovered an operation where that at least 24 people purchased 300 weapons legally from 
Texas gun shops for the Zetas DTO. According to Dewey Webb, a special agent interviewed 
by McGreal, ‘the United States is the easiest and cheapest way to purchase firearms’ (2011). 
This statement was confirmed when a drug lord form the Zetas explained that they obtained 
their arms from the US (McGreal, 2011). It is important to note that only residents have access 
to purchase weapons in American gun shops, therefore people purchasing firearms for Mexican 
DTOs are American citizens.  
42 
 
Howard Campbell (2009) has further explored the link between Hispanic gangs and Mexican 
DTOs. In his ethnography, he interviewed members of gangs or marginalised people involved 
in the drug and arms trade. In his book, he narrates the stories of Fred Morales and ‘the Chicano 
smuggler’ who are members of the criminal diaspora supplying arms to the DTOs back in 
Mexico. Indeed, members of the Mexican diaspora supply arms to Mexican DTOs (McGreal, 
2011; Grillo, 2012; Langton, 2012). In addition, Kuhn and Bunker (2011) suggest that 
Colombian DTOs are also taking advantage of this trade to obtain their own weapons.  
Besides enabling access to weapons, the criminal diaspora constitutes a workforce less 
expensive but nevertheless trustworthy for the DTOs. Guerrero Gutiérrez (2010) argues that 
DTOs subcontract members of the criminal diaspora to perform activities that allow drug lords 
to save financial resources. When DTOs subcontract gangs they save resources in their training 
and protection. For instance, members of the gangs have their own weapons and are responsible 
for trafficking the narcotics they purchase from DTOs (Grillo, 2012).   
Finally, in case of persecution and need of shelter, Mexican drug lords can use their connections 
with their criminal diaspora to hide in the United States. For example, according to Statfor, 
Barrio Azteca, a Hispanic gang from Texas provides shelter to leaders of Juarez DTOs when 
they need to hide from Mexican authorities (Burton and West, 2008). The tendency to use the 
criminal diaspora to hide has also been observed in the Colombian case. According to Pachico 
(2012a), Colombian drug warlords have moved to Argentina to hide from war prosecutors. In 
addition, Messi and Bordón (2014) argue that Colombian drug lords find a safe haven in 
Argentina because of three main reasons. Firstly, they can move easily because Colombian 
criminals do not have any criminal record in Argentina. Secondly, Colombia is an associate 
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member of the Mercosur;2 therefore, mobility between both countries is almost automatic. 
Thirdly, there are exclusively enclosed Colombian neighbourhoods such as Nordelta, where 
access is strictly controlled (Messi and Bordón: 2014). Since the Colombian criminal diaspora 
has developed isolated  and safe communities where they have access to all services such as 
schools, banks and hospitals, Argentina has become a convenient place to migrate (Messi and 
Bordón: 2014).  
This chapter has explored the relation between DTOs and criminal diasporas. It has been argued 
that DTOs have several interests in developing ties with their criminal diasporas to facilitate 
access to intelligence, security and subsistence. The next section will examine the role of 








                                                          
2 Mercosur is South America's leading trading bloc. Known as the Common Market of the South, it aims to bring 
about the free movement of goods, capital, services and people among its member states (BBC, 2012). 
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CHAPTER 4: THE ROLE OF CRIMINAL DIASPORAS IN THE CULTIVATION AND 
PROCESSING OF DRUG TRAFFICKING 
In this chapter, it will be argued that criminal diasporas have an increasing role in the 
cultivation and processing of drugs. By analysing recent events in Central and South American, 
it will be demonstrated that criminal diasporas are involved in the early stages of drug 
production for both Mexican and Colombian DTOs.  
4. 1. Diasporic participation in the cultivation of narcotics 
The data available to determine how many members of the criminal diasporas are involved in 
the cultivation of narcotics is very patchy. The two main variables used to determine the 
involvement of diasporic criminals in the cultivation of narcotics are the people arrested on 
drug plantations and the number of plantations discovered and destroyed by drug prosecutors. 
In order to determine the engagement of members of the Mexican and Colombians criminal 
diasporas, this section presents on the one hand this quantitative data and on the other hand, 
qualitative accounts published in newspapers and reports. Qualitative accounts are used 
complement the quantitative data and reflect the growing displacement of Mexican and 
Colombian DTOs across the entire Latin American region, specifically in neighbouring 
countries.  
Coca leaf crops 
Cocaine is only produced in three countries of the Western Hemisphere: Colombia (45 
percent), Peru (35-40 percent) and Bolivia (15-20 percent) (Bagley, 2012:3) The main producer 
of cocaine is Colombia, nevertheless Colombian DTOs are expanding their agricultural 
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activities beyond their national borders for example into Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama 
(Williams and Picarelli: 2005). 
The Colombian criminal diaspora is involved in two ways in the cultivation of cocaine crops. 
Firstly, members of the criminal diaspora are involved directly in the harboring and plantation 
of the cocaine crops. Secondly, members of the criminal diasporas subcontract crofters in other 
regions from whom they buy coca leafs or cocaine paste. 
Members of the criminal diaspora directly involved in the cultivation of narcotics are either 
people who deliberately decide to move to fill employment gaps in the drug industry (Arson 
and Olson, 2011) or refugees without better labor opportunities in a foreign land (Bouvier, 
2007).   
On the one hand, Arson and Olson (2011) note that since the 1990s the supply chain of cocaine 
changed after the dismantling of the two main Colombian DTOs. They argue that the end of 
the Medellin and Cali cartels propelled the dispersion and multiplication of several drug 
producers (including guerrillas) in new regions such as Putumayo, along the Ecuadorean 
border, Norte de Santander, along the Venezuelan border, north-central Antioquia near the 
Panamanian border and the northern coast, and the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta on the 
Caribbean (Arson and Olson, 2011: 29).  
On the other hand, Bouvier (2007) points out that the Colombian conflict against armed groups 
pushed hundreds of thousands of refugees abroad. Refugees are usually affected by spill-over 





Overall, the marginality, violence and crime rates that characterise borders cities in conflict 
and the lack of opportunities that refugees face can push them to join the drug trafficking 
business.  
The data available demonstrates a spread of drug plantations across the Colombian borders 
specifically in the regions near Panama and Ecuador. In a joint anti-drug operation, the 
governments of Colombia and Panama discovered a cocaine plantation in the Panamanian 
jungle in the region of Churcuti near the Caribbean (Cawley, M: 2013). Accordingly, 4,495 
plants were destroyed in an approximate area of two hectares. After the investigations, the 
authorities concluded that the coca crops were in the region occupied by the FARC and by the 
Urabeños, both Colombian DTOs (Meléndez: 2013). In Ecuador, the authorities found a coca 
plantation in a zone of difficult access near the Colombian border. Bargent (2013) reports that 
the Ecuadorian army destroyed 8,500 coca plants hidden just 100 metres from the border with 
Colombia where the FARC is located. 
The two examples mentioned show the direct engagement of the Colombian criminal diaspora 
in Ecuador and Panama. Nevertheless, there are members of the criminal diaspora interacting 
with coca growers in Peru and Bolivia, directly purchasing the coca paste (Arson and Olson, 
2011). These type of criminals can be categorised as sojourners since they do not reside in a 
different country from their place of origin. As referred by Cohen (2008) for trade diasporas, 
it can be observed that members of the criminal diasporas live between their place of origin 
and the place where they are involved in criminal activities.  
Opium crops 
According to the UNODC (2014), Mexico is the third largest opium producer after Myanmar 
and Afghanistan with an estimated production of 12,000 hectares for the year 2011. Mexico 
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has largely surpassed Colombia in the production of opium (Figure 6), nevertheless because of 
several governmental restrictions such as the war against drugs and the ban on importing 
chemicals used to synthesise narcotics, Mexican DTOs have started to diversify their areas of 
cultivation and production. Following these restrictions, in the year 2009, the government of 
Guatemala seized approximately 148% more poppy plants than in the year 2008, equivalent to 
413,479,744 plants (UNOCD, 2014).  
The growth in the cultivation of poppy in Guatemala has been recently confirmed by the 
President of Guatemala, Otto Pérez Molina, who attributes the increase of violence, homicides 
rates and drug plantations to the territorial expansion of the Mexican DTOs (Elias, 2014). The 
unstable rule of law and lack of job opportunities on the Guatemalan side have facilitated the 
spread of cultivations across the border (Elias, 2014 and Septien 2014). Overall, unemployment 
and poverty in Guatemala create a pool of potential workers ready to join the DTOs. For 
instance, Elias (2014) sustains that farmers have replaced the traditional corn and beans 
plantations with narcotic crops. In fact, according to the SAIA (Servicio de Análisis e 
Información de Antinarcótico, or the Service of Analysis and Information of anti-narcotics for 
Guatemala), a narcotics’ farmer can make a profit of 6,600 USD per harvest, equivalent to 500 







FIGURE 6. NET CULTIVATION OF OPIUM POPPY IN MEXICO AND COLOMBIA, 1999-2012  
(HECTARES) 
  
Source: UNODC (2014) World Drug Report 2014 
During the year 2012, the Guatemalan government reported the discovery of opium plantations 
in the municipality of San Marcos, near the Mexican border. Even if the exact number of 
plantations destroyed is unknown, the minister Mauricio López declared that their value was 
estimated at $308,048 billions (ACAN-EFE: 2012).  
The plantations in Guatemala are believed to be owned by members of the Mexican criminal 
diaspora who live a transnational life between Mexico and Guatemala. The Mexican criminal 
diaspora does not settle permanently in other places to cultivate their crops (Figure 6). 
Nevertheless, even if Mexico is still the main land for the Mexican DTOs agriculture, the 




















poppy crops. According to Pérez and Peters (2006), the Gulf Sinaloa and Juarez DTOs are 
increasingly employing this technique to expand their territory and production.  
4. 2. Diasporic participation in the processing of narcotics  
The processing of narcotics refers to the manufacturing of drugs. In other words, it refers to the 
conversion of the plant matter (e.g. coca leafs or poppy crops) into its marketable form (e.g. 
cocaine, heroin, etc.). Generally, the processing of narcotics involves the use of chemicals, 
synthetic substances and solvents in a laboratory. As a result, there are two available ways to 
determine where narcotics are processed. The first one focuses on the type and quantity of 
chemicals available and imported. The second takes into account the number and type of 
laboratories (UNODC, 2014). 
According to the UNODC (2014), the chemical industry is one of the most globalised of all 
manufacturing industries. Since the chemical industry is facilitated by reduced import duties 
and flexibility in the market, it is hard to identify exactly the quantity of chemicals diverted for 
the processing of narcotics. For example, toluene (the most traded chemical) is a chemical used 
as a solvent (paint thinner) and a booster in gasoline fuels but it also is used in the processing 
of cocaine (UNODC, 2014). 
The engagement of the criminal diaspora in the processing of narcotics can be observed either 
in the trade of chemicals or in their direct involvement in the drug manufacturing in clandestine 
laboratories. According to the information published by newspapers and reports, there is an 
increasing engagement of members of the Mexican and Colombian criminal diasporas in the 
processing part of drug trafficking (Mayorca, 2014; Pachico, 2011). Overall, there is a tendency 
to believe that diasporic members are opening new laboratories in other countries than their 
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homeland to avoid persecution and to take advantage of more flexible legal systems to import 
chemicals. 
Mexican criminal diaspora 
Arson and Olson (2011) note that Mexican DTOs are opening their laboratories in Central 
America. For instance, it has been discovered that the Sinaloa DTO has used Honduras as a 
base for meth and ecstasy production (Arson and Olson: 2011). In the year 2009, a Mexican 
narcotics laboratory was found in Naco Santa Barbara, Honduras.  
The authorities declared that this location used to process mainly pseudoephedrine and ecstasy 
was owned by 15 Mexicans (Arson and Olson: 2011). The fact that the location was owned by 
Mexicans, reveals the presence of criminal diasporic members in the region. In addition, it 
underlines the transnational character of the processing of narcotics in the region and the ability 
of the Mexican criminals to perform their illicit activities overseas.  In the year 2012, another 
laboratory owned by the Sinaloa DTO was discovered in Honduras (Fox, 2012). Accordingly, 
Honduran officials seized some $100 million in assets and reported that ‘El Chapo’ Guzman, 
the boss of the Sinaloa Cartel used to hide out in the country (Knott, 2012).  
The Zetas have also expanded their criminal network in Honduras in the past decade. The 
activities performed by the Mexican diasporic members in Honduras are made possible by the 
collusion with corrupted officials who protect the landing routes and sea shipments (Arson and 
Olson: 2011). This tendency to establish links with local authorities has been also noted in El 
Salvador, where according to intelligence and law enforcement officials, the Mexican DTOs 
have developed cocaine transport networks (Arson and Olson: 2011). 
The presence of Mexican DTOs has also been detected in Guatemala. In 2012, the Guatemalan 
authorities discovered what is considered the second biggest laboratory to process narcotics 
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(Cawley, 2014). La Presa Libre reported the dismantling of the most industrialised lab in 
Guatemala sprawling over 10 thousand squared metres. The lab included high-tech equipment 
for the decanting, drying and refining of narcotics and dorms for the workers involved in the 
manufacturing of drugs. Later in that year, Guatemalan officers dismantled a laboratory in 
Huehuetenango, where they sized 1,059 barrels with monomethylamine and other chemicals 
used to synthesise narcotics (Editorial Prensa Libre: 2012a and 2012b). Finally, according to 
Pachico (2012b), in 2011, authorities seized about 1,600 tons of precursor chemicals, four times 
the amount seized in 2010.  
The number of seizures and the dismantling of laboratories reflect a tendency of Mexican DTOs 
to expand their processing activities across the Central America. The laboratories are related 
to Mexican DTOs because of their financial capacities to invest and develop modern and well-
equipped laboratories. The information available is limited to determine how many members 
of the Mexican criminal diaspora remain in foreign soil to develop their activities, nevertheless 
it can be noted that they own the properties where they work (Pachico, 2012). Another 
argument is that Mexican diasporic criminals are involved in the processing of narcotics is the 
existence of dorms inside the laboratories. In fact, it has been noted that the Sinaloa cartel 
recruits Mexican chemical engineers and send them to work for the laboratories abroad 
(Univision, 2014).  
Finally, it has been argued that Mexican DTOs are developing laboratories abroad because of  
prohibitionist measures to import chemicals such ephedrine used to produce methamphetamine 
(Cawley: 2014). As a result, Mexican DTOs, specifically the Sinaloa Gulf have developed 
alliances with Chinese based organised criminal groups who export the chemicals directly to 
Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador (Pelcastre: 2014).  
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Colombian criminal diaspora 
The UNODC (2014) reported that in 2012 Colombian authorities dismantled eight clandestine 
laboratories in Colombian soil. Nevertheless, backtracking investigators suggests that there is 
tendency of the Colombian DTOs to use other localities to produce their narcotics and obtain 
chemicals, for instance across the Andean Region, specifically in Ecuador, Venezuela, 
Argentina, Brazil and Panama (UNODC, 2014).  
As for the Mexican case, Colombian DTOs are expanding into the neighbouring countries. 
Arson and Olson (2011) argue that the FARC have developed laboratories specialised in the 
production of HCL (refined cocaine) in Ecuador, specifically in the borderland region. 
Colombian DTOs in charge of processing narcotics have not only been discovered in Ecuador 
but also in Panama, Venezuela and Peru.  
In the past years, more laboratories have been discovered in the border between Colombia and 
Panama. As informed by Cawley (2013), Colombian authorities found a small laboratory 
specialised in cocaine production, estimated to produce 30 kilograms monthly. In addition, it 
has been noted than the region of Darien, is used by the FARC to store cocaine. The border 
between Panama and Colombia is characterised by its wilderness and difficult access therefore, 
it offers safe heaven to store narcotics (Pachico, 2011).  The porousness of the Colombian 
border with Panama, as well as the vegetation of the terrain attracts the members of the 
Colombian criminal diaspora to operate in that region.  
Furthermore, the Colombian criminal diaspora produces narcotics in Venezuela. According to 
Mayorca (2014) in 2012, the Venezuelan authorities dismantled 24 laboratories. These 
laboratories specialised in the manufacturing of coca leafs were located principally in the 
region of Zulia, Táchira, Apure and Delta Amacuro, close to the Colombian border. The 
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Colombian criminal diaspora is increasingly moving to process cocaine in Venezuela for two 
main reasons. 
The first element to consider is the proximity between the coca plantations and the cocaine 
laboratories. According to Mayorca (2014), DTOs are developing clandestine labs in the same 
location as coca leaf plantations to have easier access to the raw material. 
The second reason why Colombian DTOs are moving to Venezuela is the pool of workers 
available to join their industry. According to Venezuelan militaries, the Colombian labs are 
found in the same region where Colombian refugees settle (Mayorca, 2014). As previously 
explained, Colombian refugees are a  potential workers for the Colombian criminal diaspora, 
specifically for the FARC.  
Finally, Colombian labs have also been found in Peru. During an anti-drug operation, Peruvian 
officials captured seven Colombian warlords working in coca laboratories (Chumpitaz: 2011). 
In addition, according to a Peruvian investigator, prosecutors and investigators have detected 
a flow of Colombian migration specialised in the processing of cocaine (Chumpitaz: 2011). He 
explained that the new Colombian criminal technique consists of sending Colombian chemists 
to run the Peruvian laboratories (Chumpitaz: 2011). 
To conclude, the information available reflects that there is a trend of both the Mexican and 
Colombian DTOs  processing narcotics overseas. In this specific phase of the drug trafficking 
process, we can conclude that the members of the criminal diaspora support drug production 
by negotiating with local authorities and by running laboratories. This means that members of 
the criminal diaspora tend to occupy the higher positions in the laboratories, such as chemists 
and engineers or as negotiators with local authorities (Univision, 2014; Chumpitaz: 2011).  
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Employing members of the diaspora might be useful for the DTOs for two main reasons: 
academic qualification and power of coercion over their family back in their places of origin. 
First, it is suspected that national DTOs prepare and choose the engineers and chemists who 
join their criminal organisations. Second, by subcontracting members of their diasporas, 
national DTOs can easily threaten their family and strong-arm them into working more 
effectively. Finally, it has been demonstrated that diasporas prefer to move to neighbouring 















CHAPTER 5: THE ROLE OF CRIMINAL DIASPORAS IN THE TRANSPORT AND 
DISTRIBUTION OF DRUG TRAFFICKING 
This chapter argues that the Mexican and Colombian criminal diasporas are engaged in the 
transport and distribution of narcotics in the Latin American region and overseas. In general, 
DTOs integrate members of their diasporas in these steps of the drug trafficking process 
because they share the same language, culture, and ethnicity therefore they are portrayed as 
more trustworthy people. Furthermore, it can be noticed that for these particular stages of the 
narcotics trade process, DTOs tend to integrate migrants of second and further generations that 
know better the terrain where drugs are being imported and distributed.   
5. 1. The role of criminal diasporas in the transport of narcotics 
In the context of drug trafficking, transport refers to the action of taking narcotics from one 
place to another by means of a vehicle, aircraft, or ship. The transport of narcotics is quite 
complex at it involves a large range of agents in Latin America. Once drugs are synthesised, 
they can be sent to the destination country by air, sea or land (Figure. 7). The transport of 
narcotics can be divided into retail and wholesale. Retail trade is when drug traffickers smuggle 
drugs individually and in small quantities across borders whereas wholesale refers to the 
trafficking of large amounts of narcotics (Zaitch, 2002).  
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FIGURE 7. DRUG TRAFFICKING TRADE IN LATIN AMERICA
 
Source: Pérez Ventura (2014). El Camino de la Droga. El Orden Mundial en siglo XXI. 
 
The Mexican criminal diaspora transporting narcotics to the US 
In the Latin American region, Mexican DTOs are the most active in relation to drug trafficking 
due to the alliances developed with Colombian DTOs (Arson and Olson, 2011). Mexican DTOs 
control mostly all the drug trafficking to the United States, according to the American 
government 90 per cent of the illicit drugs entering its borders passes through the Central 
American Isthmus and Mexico (Arson and Olson, 2011:27). 
Diasporic members engaged in the transport of narcotics from Mexico to the US can be broken 
down in two main categories: the sojourner traders and members of the Mexican criminal 
diaspora already settled in the US. Focusing on the wholesale of narcotics, three main 
techniques of trafficking used by the Mexican criminal diaspora can be identified: 1) a direct 
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route from the place of production to the destination, 2) an intermediate route involving other 
DTOs and 3) a route sustained with the collusion of the Mexican American criminal diaspora.  
Mexican DTOs are operating in Central American countries to cultivate and produce their own 
narcotics. Furthermore, the seizures and laboratories discovered show that they have the 
necessary logistics to conduct the trafficking directly from the place where drugs are produced. 
For instance, in a laboratory dismantling in 2009 in Honduras, planes and landing runways 
were discovered (Arson and Olson, 2011). In fact, it has been noted that drug shipments leave 
Honduras by air in light planes and small helicopters flying short distances (Arson and Olson, 
2011). 
In addition to transporting their own-made narcotics, Mexican diasporic criminals have 
developed channels to transport Colombian cocaine. According to Arson and Olson (2011), 
recent reports suggest that the Gulf DTO picks up cocaine in Costa Rica and Nicaragua and 
traffics it through Honduran territory by land and sea. The UNODC (2012) explains that 
cocaine trafficking arrests in Central America have increased in recent years. For instance in 
Costa Rica, where even if the majority of the traffickers arrested are still Costa Ricans, the 
UNODC (2012) reports that there is an increasing number of Mexican and Colombian 
criminals involved in the drug trade in that region (Figure. 8).  
For example in February 2011, three Mexicans were arrested in el Guaco, Costa Rica with 
more than 300 kg of cocaine (UNODC, 2012: 42). Even if this type of diasporic criminals can 
be considered sojourners, they are having an increasing presence in the region. In addition, we 
can identify them as members of the Mexican diaspora because of their identity and the ethnic 
characteristics that link them back to their homeland.   
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Besides the increasing number of Mexicans arrested in Central America, we can observe their 
growing presence in the region through the behaviour of local gangs in other countries. Arson 
and Olson (2011) note that local gangs in Honduras are adopting cultural traits of Mexican 
DTOs. The fact that local gangs and criminals in Honduras are copying cultural elements of 
the Mexican DTOs suggests the rising power of the Mexican criminal diaspora overseas and 
the aspiration to become as influential as they are. For instance, drug traffickers in Central 
America are listening to narcorridos, songs composed for Mexican drug traffickers which 
lyrics narrate their stories (Arson and Olson, 2011).  
The second type of members of the Mexican criminal diaspora involved in the transport of 
narcotics are gangsters. Gangsters have an important role in the trafficking of drugs to the US, 
specifically for land trafficking. 
As formulated in the third chapter of this paper, Mexican DTOs have interests in developing a 
solid relation with Mexican-American gangs to ensure their access to information, security and 
subsistence. Since members of the Mexican criminal diaspora living in the US have access to 
more information about the complications encountered at the border and the unforeseen 
incidents during the trip, they have become important players in the drug trafficking to the 
United States (Grillo, 2012).  
59 
 
FIGURE 8. NATIONALITIES OF PEOPLE ARRESTED FOR COCAINE TRAFFICKING IN COSTA RICA IN 
2010 
 
Source: UNODC (2012) 
The Colombian criminal diaspora  
The Colombian criminal diaspora has an important role in the drug transportation; however, it 
is not exactly the same as for the Mexican diaspora. The role of the Colombian diaspora in 
trafficking drugs to the United States differs because of three main reasons: firstly because of 
its geographical location; secondly, because of the lack of existence of exclusively Colombian 
gangs living in the US; and most importantly because of the agreements between Mexican and 
Colombian DTOs. As a result of these differences, it can be concluded that the main role of the 
Colombian criminal diaspora is to transport the narcotics to Central America in order to supply 
Mexican DTOs.  
The role of the Colombian diaspora trading drugs to the US was not always mainly through 
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criminal networks in Miami and New York (Collier and Gamarra, 2001). Nevertheless, the 
major offensive against Colombian DTOs carried out by the American and Colombian 
governments in the late 1980s shifted the drug trafficking routes and actors involved in the 
business (Bouvier, 2007). 
Nowadays, Colombian DTOs use Central America as the hub for cocaine trafficking. This trend 
can be observed in Panama, Honduras and Costa Rica (Arson and Olson, 2011; UNODC, 2002 
and Yagoub, 2014). According to Arson and Olson (2011), members of the Rastrojos managed 
to traffic cocaine in illicit planes from Venezuela to Honduras in 2009. As for the Mexican 
case, Colombian DTOs have enough resources to purchase aircrafts and bribe local authorities.  
In Panama, Yagoub (2014) explains that the Colombian DTOs are positioning members of the 
criminal diaspora (paramilitaries) in the region to facilitate the transit of drugs to the north. 
Supposedly, in this region members of the FARC and Urabeños are in charge of trafficking 
narcotics in retail. This technique consists of carrying small packages of cocaine in backpacks 
to hide easily in the jungle.  
Finally, the UNODC (2012) has argued that a growing number of traffickers arrested in Costa 
Rica are originally from Colombia (Figure. 8). For instance, in January 2011, Costa Rican 
authorities dismantled a Colombian DTO and detained five members of the Colombian 
criminal diaspora transporting narcotics (UNODC: 2012). Overall, the Colombian criminal 
diaspora has a minor role in the transport of drugs to the US because the Mexican criminal 
diaspora is in charge of bringing their cocaine from Central America. However, the information 
available reflects an increasing involvement of the Colombian diaspora in the transport of drugs 
to Panama, Honduras and Costa Rica, where Mexican DTOs travel to get the merchandise.  
61 
 
Even if the majority of drugs consumed in the United States are transported through the 
Mexican route (UNODC, 2014), it is important to note that the Colombian criminal diasporas 
have also developed their own trafficking routes based mainly in Florida. The members of the 
criminal Colombian diaspora who migrated as the result of the conflict in the 1980s sustain this 
route (Malone and Malone-Rowe, 2014). In fact, Collier and Gamarra (2001) argue that as a 
result of the conflict, many Colombians moved to the south of Florida, specifically to Miami, 
which became a very important pole for drug trafficking. Florida is still a gateway for 
Colombian drugs as shown by the seizures in the region. For instance, on the 15th of April 2014, 
7,000 pounds of cocaine were sized in Miami transported by three Colombians (Clary, 2014). 
5. 2. The role of criminal diasporas in the distribution of narcotics 
In the context of drug trafficking, distribution involves the spread or share of narcotics in a 
determinate area. There are also two mechanisms of distribution: wholesale and retail. In the 
particular cases analysed in this paper, it will be argued that criminal diasporas, specifically the 
Mexican one, have an important role in both the wholesale and retail of narcotics in the United 
States.  
According to Brophy (2008), in the early 1990s, US anti-drug operations began to focus on the 
dismantling of drug trafficking networks from Colombia to the US though the Caribbean. 
Consequently, Colombian DTOs diverted their traditional route and established direct 
connections with Mexican DTOs. This shift affects the distribution of Colombian drugs in the 
US and in turn the engagement of the Colombian criminal diaspora in the region. For instance 
Garzón (2013) notes that the fact that Mexican factions became the main distributors of cocaine 
in the United States encouraged the Colombian groups to seek new markets and expand their 
trafficking routes to Europe. In fact, Europe became an attractive pole to export narcotics for 
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Colombian DTOs specifically because it offered them better access to retail distribution 
(Garzón, 2013). The recent changes in the dynamics of drug distribution reflect the 
predominant role of the Mexican criminal diaspora in the distribution of narcotics in the United 
States.  
As previously demonstrated, there is a strong link between Mexican DTOs and members of the 
Mexican criminal diaspora living in the United States, who enable a safer traffic of the drugs 
at the US-Mexican border. According to the National Gangs Intelligence (2013), US-based 
gangs cooperate primarily in drug smuggling activities. In fact, according to the available data, 
most gangs, specifically the ones from the criminal Mexican diaspora are involved in the 
wholesale and street-level distribution of drugs (National Gangs Intelligence: 2013). 
Firstly, the Mexican criminal diaspora assists the wholesale distribution by sustaining links 
with Mexican DTOs to transport cocaine, marijuana and methamphetamines; secondly, the 
diasporic gangsters re-distribute in smaller quantities (street-level distribution) the narcotics 
across the US territory (National Gangs Intelligence, 2013). According to the available reports 
of the NGI (2010, 2011 and 2013), the main gangs that control the drug distributions are the 
Latin Kings, MS-13, Sureños, Norteños and Barrio Azteca.  
Most of the gang members involved in drug distribution are linked with Mexican DTOs such 
as the Juarez, Sinaloa and Zetas criminal groups (NGI, 2013). The main diasporic 
characteristics of drug distributors are the following: first, they maintain a collective memory 
about the homeland and strong ethnic connections and second, they have a troubled relationship 
with host societies (Cohen, 2008:17). These two characteristics enable them to be more prone 
to work in alliance with Mexican DTOs to develop networks of distribution.  
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One interesting example that illustrates this argument is the case of Barrio Azteca. Barrio 
Azteca is a gang that has developed strong distribution networks mainly in the south of the 
United States (Burton, 2008). It has been argued that this gang receives discounts on drugs in 
exchange of providing tactical information and help to the Mexican DTOs to distribute drugs 
in the US (Burton, 2008). One particularity of this gang is that they have developed codes in 
Nahuatl, the indigenous language of the Aztecs (Guerrero Gutierrez, 2010). In addition to be 
useful to maintain secrecy and discretion, the use of Nahuatl reflects an attachment to 
indigenous and Mexican ethnic roots, which characterise the diasporic members.  
Furthermore, the troubled relationship between the members of the criminal diaspora and the 
American society makes them more vulnerable to interact with Mexican DTOs. First, because 
they might feel excluded from the American society and second because they might not feel 
any sense of respect for the law, rules, and people in the US. Overall, the troubled relationship 
with their hostland and the lack of involvement in the America society are elements that make 
more prone the members of the criminal diaspora to interact with Mexican DTOs and develop 
distribution channels for narcotics both at the wholesale and at the retail level. 
The involvement of the Colombian criminal diaspora in the distribution of narcotics in the 
American region has changed. Overall, the Colombian criminal diaspora has a discreet role in 
the distribution of drugs because of the evolution of the drug distribution networks, which 
enabled the Mexican DTOs and gangs to control the distribution channels (NGI, 2013).  
In this chapter, it has been argued that the Mexican criminal diaspora has a predominant role 
in the transport and distribution of narcotics in the American region. Nevertheless, the 
Colombian criminal diaspora has still a very important role in the transport of cocaine, 
especially in the Central American region, where the Mexican DTOs travel to stock up on 
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narcotics. Both the Colombian and Mexican criminal diasporas have the means, desire and 
capabilities to develop networks specialised in the transport of narcotics in Panama, Guatemala, 
Costa Rica and Honduras. Finally, it has been demonstrated that the Mexican criminal diaspora 
plays an important role in both the wholesale and the retail distribution of narcotics in the US. 
The number of Mexican and Hispanic gangs with members of the criminal Mexican diaspora 
as well as the reports published by the National Gangs Intelligence show the predominance of 

















This paper argued that both the Mexican and Colombian DTOs interact with the members of 
their respective criminal diasporas in the drug trafficking process. This study presents an 
innovative theoretical framework to study the relation between national drug trafficking 
organisations and members of their migrant communities who participate in these illicit 
activities.  
The theoretical framework presented in this paper underlines the diasporic characteristics 
sustained over time by the Mexican and Colombian DTOs. As a result, it is argued that identity, 
ethnicity and ties with their homeland are key elements that sustain the relation between 
national DTOs and members of their diasporas. 
This paper unpacks the drug-trafficking process in cultivation, production, transit and 
distribution. This clear-cut stages of the drug trafficking process enables an exhaustive analysis 
of the role of the members of the criminal diasporas. Overall, it can be concluded that the 
Mexican and Colombian DTOs are interested in developing and sustaining networks with the 
members of their criminal diasporas in order to guarantee their survival, security and access to 
intelligence.  
Furthermore, it can be concluded that the role of the members of the criminal diaspora varies 
in each phase of the drug trafficking process. In fact, the role of the diasporic members in the 
whole process depends on their legal status, level of education and hierarchical status inside 
the DTO.  
The results of this research highlight the relevance of integrating elements of the diasporic 
scholarship in the study of transnational criminal networks. With these elements, it can be 
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concluded that criminal networks are sustained by trust and interdependent relations derived 
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